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ABSTRACT 
Empirical work on tax compliance has yielded conservative estimates of 
unreported taxable income in the U.S. that average 10 to 15 percent of total 
taxable income for recent years. Moreover, it is held by many that the rate 
of noncompliance has been growing dramatically. This problem is widely 
perceived as one of eroding ethics -- more and more people are ceasing to 
comply voluntarily and are instead acting "strategically" in response to the 
structure of the U.S. income tax laws. We propose a simple model of tax 
compliance in which an exogenously given fraction of taxpayers comply 
voluntarily, while the remainder behave strategically. We distinguish between 
a general decision to act strategically and a specific decision not to report 
honestly. This is done in an equilibrium setting where the IRS is allowed to 
adjust its audit policy in response to taxpayer behavior. Because the audit 
policy of the IRS is endogenous and thus co-determined with the reporting 
behavior of potential noncompliers , several non-intuitive results emerge. In 
particular, we find that an increase in the fraction of strategic taxpayers 
decreases the likelihood that a given strategic taxpayer fails to comply. In 
fact , the decrease in the likelihood of underreporting exactly offsets the 
increase in the fraction of strategic taxpayers, so that aggregate compliance 
(and net tax revenues) are unaffected. 
AN EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF TAX COMPLIANCE WITH A BAYESIAN 
AUDITOR AND SOME "HONEST" TAXPAYERS 
Michael J. Graetz, Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde• 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Empirical work on tax compliance has yielded conservative estimates of 
unreported taxable income in the U.S. that average 10 to 15 percent of total 
taxable income for recent years. 1 Moreover, many observers believe that the 
rate of noncompliance has been growing dramatically in recent years. IRS 
Commissioner Egger reported in 1982 that the "income tax gap" in the legal 
sector grew from $29 billion in 1973 to $87 billion in 1981, and projected a 
gap of $120 billion by 1985. 2 Equally shocking estimates are offered of 
income tax evasion in the illegal sector. These estimates of the extent of 
noncompliance have produced a certain sense of panic among commentators in 
academia. the government and the news media. One went so far as to say that 
"the dramatic deterioration in compliance levels witnessed thus far , if not 
reversed quickly and forcefully , will gain further momentum and eventually 
erode, beyond repair, the integrity of our present income tax system. "3 
Even assuming these estimates are roughly correct , there is still a 
serious problem with identifying the source of the problem. Most experts 
consider the collection of U. S. income taxes to be essentially automatic. The 
fact that taxpayers themselves provide the initial (and as a practical matter, 
often final) estimate of their tax liability on their tax returns has produced 
• We would like to thank Kim Border and members of the Caltech Theory 
Workshop for helpful comments. The financial support of National 
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an almost mythological characterization of the federal income tax as 
"voluntary. " To quote Commissioner Egger again: 
"There has always been some resistance in this country, from colonial 
times onward, to virtually every form of taxation. As a general rule, 
with some exceptions, the resistance or protest was episodic and 
geographically contained. The system was never seriously threatened or 
weakened. From early times , as de Toqueville observed, most Americans 
had an unusual willingness to engage in voluntary activity for the public 
good. It can be credited in part to the "frontier mentality" which 
required cooperation for survival. That willingness still exists in 
large part; most Americans do engage in the spirit of voluntarism and 
most Americans do subscribe voluntarily to and comply with the tax laws 
to which we are all subject. Unfortunately , a growing number of what are 
otherwise honest citizens are becoming non-persons in the tax system or 
are finding various ways to s�bmerge parts of their income, so as not to 
have it subject to taxation. " 
Whether one agrees with Commissioner Egger's view of history or not, 
it is clear that he perceives the problem to be fundamentally one of eroding 
ethics -- more and more people are ceasing to comply voluntarily and are 
instead acting "strategically" in response to the structure of the U. S. income 
tax laws. In other words, the proportion of taxpayers who routinely and 
habitually comply with income tax rules is thought to be declining -- perhaps 
at a rapid pace. It is of course possible that large numbers of people have 
always acted strategically , and we have simply become better at measuring the 
extent of such behavior. Finally , one might argue that the structure of 
enforcement policies, coupled with general increases in real income or tax 
rates, have increased the benefits of noncompliance relative to the costs,  so 
that even without a change in underlying attitudes, more people now find it 
profitable not to comply. 
Assuming that voluntary compliance is on the decline, there are at 
least three reasons for concern. First , at a time of substantial budget 
deficits. revenue losses from noncompliance become particularly signi ficant. 
Second. there is an issue whether the structure of tax legislation is creating 
a nation of criminals, the implication being that a general decrease in 
respect for the law stemming from noncompliance with the tax laws will "spill 
over" into other areas. Finally, there is the issue of equity -- compliance 
is desirable purely on the grounds that the tax system should be fair, with 
equals paying equal taxes. 
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We will focus mainly on the revenue issue. We will also distinguish 
between a general decision to act strategically and a specific decision not to 
comply. Unlike prior work on this subject, we treat the taxpayer's filing of 
a tax return as having an impact on IRS enforcement decisions and we explore 
the heretofore ignored impact of the existence of a group of "habitual 
compliers," both with respect to taxpayers who behave strategically and to IRS 
enforcement. This will be done in an equilibrium setting where the IRS is 
allowed to adjust its audit policy in response to taxpayer behavior. 
While economists have long treated the decision to evade taxes as a 
matter of rational choice, they have only recently begun to regard it as an 
equilibrium phenomenon. Drawing from Becker's (1968) classic work on the 
economics of crime, the traditional treatment of tax evasion in a partial 
equilibrium framework is due to Allingham and Sandmo (1972) . Their model 
assumes an exogenously-given penalty system consisting of a probability p of 
audit and a fine F which is proportional to unreported income. Srinivasan 
(1973) of fers a similar model in which he discusses the allocation of 
resources for detection, but presents no analysis of equilibrium interactions. 
Subsequent variations on the basic partial equilibrium model can be found in 
Yitzhaki (1974) , Christiansen (1980) , and Fishburn (1981) . 
There have also been multi-period analyses of the choice of a penalty 
system to minimize tax evasion subject to a budget constraint (Greenberg , 
1983) , to maximize net revenue (Landsberger and Meilijson, 1982) , and to 
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maximize an exogenously given social utility function (Rubinstein, 1979) . 
These analyses have essentially treated the probability of audit p as 
independent of a taxpayer's reported income, although the extent of 
noncompliance depends on detection probabilities. Although detection 
probabilities are treated as uniform across taxpayers, some analysts have 
explored the optimal (uniform) probability of detection. In some cases, the 
probability of auddit is made contingent upon other past data such as whether 
the taxpayer had been caught underreporting in the past (e. g. , Landsberger and 
Meilijson , 1982 , Greenberg, 1983 and Rubinstein, 1979) .5 
In a previous paper (Reinganum and Wilde, forthcoming) , two of us have 
analyzed a principal/agent model of income tax evasion in which the IRS is 
designated the principal and the taxpayer the agent. This formulation permits 
the IRS to take account of the information contained in a taxpayer's report, 
and treats the IRS audit and enforcement strategy as an endogenous policy 
dependent on tax return information. Below we analyze a somewhat simpler 
model with this same feature; that is, the probability that a taxpayer is 
audited depends upon his report. In contrast to our previous model, we take a 
Nash equilibrium (rather than a principal/agent) approach to this problem. 
With such a model, each agent's strategies must maximize his respective 
payoff ,  given the other agent's strategy choice. The principal/agent approach 
requires the IRS to commit itself to an audit policy which will typically not 
be a "best response" to the agent's reporting strategy. The Nash equilibrium 
framework neither permits nor requires such commitment; instead, it follows 
the natural temporal order of play: first the taxpayer reports his income; 
subsequently the IRS decides (on the basis of his reported income) whether to 
perform an investigative audit. If the taxpayer is not audited, the tax 
liability is computed on the basis of reported income; if the taxpayer is 
s 
audited, then the tax liability is computed on the basis of true income (which 
is discovered in the audit process) , plus any applicable fines. 
The next section of this paper will present a simple model of this 
"tax compliance game" given that some fraction of all taxpayers are 
voluntarily "honest" in paying their taxes. Income levels, tax rates and 
fines will all be taken as exogenous. To keep things simple, we assume income 
takes one of two values, high or low. The IRS does not observe true income, 
only a report made by the taxpayer. Equilibrium involves a probability of 
audit, chosen by the IRS. and a probability of noncompliance, chosen by those 
taxpayers who act strategically. Thus the model assumes the IRS can audit as 
many taxpayers as it wants; no budget constraint is imposed. Because the 
audit policy of the IRS is endogenous and thus co-determined with the 
reporting behavior of potential noncompliers, several non-intuitive results 
emerge. For example, an increase in the proportion of strategic taxpayers has 
precisely one effect; it decreases the likelihood of under-reporting by 
strategic taxpayers. In fact, the decrease in the likelihood of under­
reporting exactly of fsets the increase in the percentage of strategic 
taxpayers, so neither aggregate noncompliance nor aggregate revenue is 
affected. 
Another initially surprising result is that an increase in audit costs 
results in an increase in both individual and aggregate noncompliance and an 
increase in the aggregate number of audits. Again, this is an equilibrium 
phenomenon -- when audit costs rise, strategic taxpayers are less likely to 
comply. Hence it also pays to audit them more often. Finally, an increase in 
the fine for under-reporting leads to less noncompliance, as expected, but it 
also leads to less auditing. This happens in spite of the fact that an 
increase in the fine makes auditing more profitable since noncompliance 
falls. the equilibrium level of auditing can fall as well. It is worth 
emphasizing that some (but not all) of these results depend upon the absence 
of a budget constraint on the IRS' ability to audit. Budget-constrained 
auditing is considered in Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde (1984). 
The next section of this paper will present our formal model and 
characterize the equilibrium. 6 Section 3 will discuss various comparative 
statics results and Section 4 will analyze several interesting extensions. A 
final section will summarize our results, discuss weaknesses of the model and 
suggest possible avenues for future research. 
2. THE MODEL 
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Suppose that some taxpayers are "habitual compliers; " that is, they 
report their income truthfully regardless of their pecuniary self-interest. 
The remaining taxpayers examine their incentives carefully and act so as to 
maximize expected utility, taking as given the probability of audit associated 
with the income they choose to report. Denote the proportion of potential 
noncompliers by p and the proportion of habitual compliers by 1 - p, where 
O(p(l. 
For simplicity, we assume there are only two income classes -- high 
and low , denoted IH and IL, respectively. Since the IRS does not directly 
observe income, the taxpayer may report either high or low income. Let dH 
denote a report of high income and dL a report of low income. A strategy for 
the taxpayer is a function a : CIH'IL} -1 [0,1] . where 
aH ,. a(IH) Pr (potential noncomplier reports dL I IH} 
and 
aL ,. a(IL) Pr (potential noncomplier reports dL I IL) . 
Similarly, a strategy for the IRS is a function p {cJH'cJL) --7 [0,1]. where 
PH = P<ciH) Pr {IRS audits I taxpayer reported <JH) 
and 
p1 = P<cJL) =Pr {IRS audits I taxpayer reported cJL) .  
Let TH and TL represent the tax payments owed by high and low income 
taxpayers. respectively. We assume that TH 2 TL. Taxpayers who are 
discovered to be underreporting income are fined F in addition, but the IRS 
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suffers an audit cost c per audit to discover underreporting. We suppose that 
TH + F - TL > c. That is, the increment to revenue associated with uncovering 
a noncomplier exceeds the audit cost. If this were not true, then even if 
noncompliers could be identified a priori, it would not pay to audit them and 
collect the taxes owed plus the fines. 7 We assume that both the taxes TH, TL 
and the fine F are taken as fixed by the IRS.8 Let q represent the fraction of 
high income taxpayers in the populace; q is also the probability that a 
randomly chosen taxpayer has high income. 
A simple game tree describes the information and actions available to 
each player. With probability p, the taxpayer is a potential noncomplier in 
which case the taxpayer and the IRS play the game described by Figure 1. With 
probability 1 - p, the taxpayer is a habitual complier and simply reports his 
or her income truthfully. In this case, the game tree is truncated, and is 
displayed in Figure 2. The taxpayer knows which tree is relevant to his or 
her decision-making, but the IRS does not. Thus the actual game tree is a 
hybrid of the trees in Figures 1 and 2, and is shown in Figure 3. Since the 
IRS cannot distinguish between habitual compliers and potential noncompliers a 
priori, it must compute the conditional distribution of income, given the 
8 
taxpayer's report. 
[Figures 1, 2 and 3 approximately here] 
Let µH Pr {IHI ciHJ. By Bayes' Rule, 
µH = Pr{ciH I IH}Pr{IHJ/[Pr{ciH I IH}Pr{IH} + Pr(cJH I IL}Pr{IL}]. 
For any given strategy a of the potential noncompliers, this reduces to 
µH = (p (l-aH)+l-p)q/[ (p (l-aH)+l-p)q+p (l-aL) (l-q)]. 
This expression accounts for the fact that 1-p percent of the populace 
always reports truthfully while the other p percent use the strategy a. 
Similarly, if µL = Pr{IH I cJL), 
µL = pqaH/[pqaH+ (p�+l-p)(l-q)]. (1) 
We assume the IRS is risk-neutral; it deals with a large population of 
taxpayers and thus achieves (nearly) its expected net revenue. Expected net 
revenue to the IRS when it observes a report of high income, and the 
strategies are (a,p), is 
11 (cJH;a, p) = pH[µH (TH-c) + (1-µH) (TL-c)] + (1-PH> Tw 
Similarly, the IRS' expected net revenue when a report of cJL is received is 
II<cJL;a, p) = pL[µL (TH+F-c) + (1-µL) (TL-c)] + (1-PL)TL. 
The payoff to a potential noncomplier who has high income, in expected 
utility terms, is 
U (IH;a, p) aH[pLu(IH- TH-F) + (1-pL)u (IH-TL)] + (1-aH)u(IH-TH). 
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We assume that u'(.) > 0 and u'' ( .) < 0. For a potential noncomplier with low 
income, 
U(IL;a,p) = �u(IL-TL) + (1-aL)[pHu(IL-TL)+(l-PH)u(IL-TH)]. 
A best response for the IRS to a given strategy a for potential 
,... ,... 
noncompliers is a strategy p(a) such that II< . ;a,p(a)) 2 II< .;a,p) for all 
other strategies p. Similarly, a best response for potential noncompliers to 
,... 
any given auditing policy p is a strategy a(p) such that 
,... 
U( .;a(p), p) 2 U(.;a,p) for all strategies a. Finally, a Nash equilibrium is a 
A A 
pair of strategies (a•, p•) such that a• = a(p•) and p• =pea•). 
For any given strategy for potential noncompliers, a, the IRS wants to 
choose p = CPH'PL) to maximize II (. ;a,p). The marginal benefit of auditing a 
taxpayer who reports high income is 
aIJ(dH;a,p>/apH = (1-µH) (TL-TH) - c < o. 
Thus there is a dominant choice of PH• = O; audit no one who reports high 
(2) 
income. The marginal benefit of auditing a taxpayer who reports low income is 
aIICdL;a,p)/apL = µL (TH+F-TL) - c. (3) 
This gain is increasing with µL' the conditional probablity that the taxpayer 
has high income given that he or she reported low income, with TH' the tax 
owed by high-income taxpayers, and with F, the fine; since µL is an increasing 
function of �· p and q, the marginal benefit of auditing a taxpayer who 
reports low income also increases with aL, the conditional probability of 
noncompliance, with p, the fraction of potential noncompliers in the 
population, and with q, the proportion of high-income taxpayers. This gain is 
decreasing with TL' the tax owed by low-income taxpayers, and with c, the 
audit cost. Consequently, the IRS' best response to a strategy a is 
,,,.{ 
1 if µL(a) > µL 
[0,1] if µL(a) = µL. 
O if µL(a) < µL 
where µL(a) is as described in equation (1). and 
µL = c/(TH +F-TL). 
For a given auditing policy p, the strategic taxpayer or potential 
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noncomplier wishes to choose a policy a = (aH, aL) so as to maximize expected 
utility. The marginal gain to reporting low income when one actually has low 
income is 
aU(IL;a,p)/aaL = (1-pH) [u (IL-TL) - u(IL-TH)] 2 0 
for all PH 2 O (with strict inequality when PH > 0) • Thus it is a dominant 
strategy for a low-income individual to report low income; aL• = 1. The 
marginal gain to reporting low income when one actually has high income --
that is, the marginal benefit of noncompliance -- is 
<lU(IH;a,p)/aaH (1-pL)[u(IH-TL) - u(IH-TH)] 
+ pL[u (IH-TH-F) - u(IH-TH)]. 
(4) 
( 5) 
This gain is decreasing with PL' the probability of audit, with F. the fine, 
and with TL' the tax owed by low-income taxpayers. Its dependence upon TH' 
the tax owed by high-income taxpayers, is ambiguous in general. This is 
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because the expression above consists of two parts; the coefficient of (1-PL> 
represents the gain due to noncompliance when one is not audited; this gain 
increases with TH. The coefficient of PL represents the loss due to 
noncompliance when one is apprehended and punished; this loss is increased (in 
absolute value) by an increase in TH. For the case of risk-neutral taxpayers, 
the marginal benefit of noncompliance increases with TH. Equation (4) implies 
that a best response for the taxpayer to the strategy p is 
where 
,.. 
aH(p) 
{. 1 if •t < •t 
: [0,l] �f PL = PL' 
- 0 if PL > PL 
PL = [u(IH-TL) - u (IH-TH) ]/[u (IH-TL) - u (IH-TH-F) ]. ( 6) 
Clearly PL e (0,1) . Substituting� · 1 in the definition of µL implies that 
where 
,.. 
PLC a) 
{. 1 " .. ' ., 
: [0,1] if aH = aH' 
- 0 if aH < aH 
aH = (1-q) c/pq (TH+F-TL-c) . 
Here aH > 0 unless F is literally infinite (assuming that 1 < q < 1 and 
(7) 
c > 0) . But we assume that F � IH-TH; that is, the IRS cannot take more than 
a person's income. Hence there is always some chance that strategic taxpayers 
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will underreport. However, it might be that aH L 1. We can graph these best 
reply functions in [0, 1] X [0,1]. This gives two possible Nash equilibrium 
configurations. 
[Figures 4 and S approximately here] 
In the first equilibrium (see Figure 4), (aH*•PL*) = (1,0) . That is, 
all strategic taxpayers underreport but there is no auditing. This occurs if 
�H > 1.
9 In this case, it is not worth auditing any individual who reports low 
income (given that one cannot tell whether the individual is reporting 
truthfully or is failing to comply; the assumption that TH + F - TL > c 
implies that it is always worth auditing someone who is known to be evading) • 
Thus the interesting case is that illustrated in Figure 5, in which the unique 
equilibrium is (att*•PL*) = (�H.pL) .  In this case, a fraction� of high­
income potential noncompliers actually do underreport, and a fraction PL of 
taxpayers who report low income are audited. 
3. COMPARATIVE STATICS 
There are four equilibrium expressions which are of interest: 
aH -- the conditional probability of noncompliance given that the 
individual is a potential noncomplier and has high income; 
PN = qpaH -- the unconditional probability of noncompliance; 
pL -- the conditional probability of audit given a low report; and 
PA (qpaH + 1-q) p L -- the unconditional probability of audit. 
Recall that aH and PL are given by equations (8) and (9) below, 
respectively. 
aH (1-q)c/pq(TH+F-TL-c). 
PL = [u (IH-TL) - u (IH-TH)J/[u (IH-TL) - u (IH-TH-F)]. 
There are many parameters of potential interest, and comparative 
statics results are summarized in Table 1 below. 
Table 1 
TH TL F c 
aH + - + 
PN 
- + - + 
PL * 
- - 0 
PA ** ** 
- + 
q p 
0 
0 0 
0 
* ambiguous in general; when taxpayers are risk-neutral, this entry is +. 
** ambiguous in general; when taxpayers are risk-neutral, 
aPA/aTH = -aPA/aTL L 0 (� 0) as F L c (� c). 
1 3 
( 8) 
( 9) 
Some of these results are quite intuitive; for instance, consider the 
result that a�H/aF < O. Recall that aH is the equilibrium probability with 
which a high-income potential noncomplier actually fails to comply. An 
increase in the fine for evasion reduces the likelihood that a potential 
noncomplier actually fails to comply. This is a standard result in the 
economics of crime and the tax evasion literature. But, with our model, we 
also see the equilibrium effect that apL/aF < O; an increase in the fine F 
results in less noncompliance and less auditing, both at the level of the 
individual taxpayer and at the aggregate level. This is an equilibrium effect 
14 
because the direct impact of an increase in the fine is (from equation (3) ) to 
increase the marginal benefit of auditing; however, since taxpayers respond by 
increasing their compliance rate, the IRS can actually reduce its equilibrium 
number of audits. As we have already pointed out, driving equilibrium 
noncompliance (and the equilibrium probability of audit) to zero would require 
a literally infinite fine. 
Indeed, several of these results are counterintuitive until one 
remembers that equilibrium effects play a crucial role in this analysis. For 
instance, an increase in the audit cost actually results in an increase in 
individual and aggregate noncompliance, and an increase in the aggregate 
number of audits. To understand why this must be so, suppose there �s an 
exogenous increase ii". audit costs; if potenUal noncompliers made no 
adjustment, then it would no longer pay to audit anyone (because the IRS is 
just indifferent in equilibrium between auditing and not auditing taxpayers 
who repoPt low income). But then potential noncompliers should underreport 
with probability l, which in turn implies that the IRS should audit with 
probability l, and so on. Thus there must be an adjustment by potential 
noncompliers, and they must adjust their probability of noncompliance upwards, 
so that audits will in general be more successful (i.e., catch more 
noncompliers and collect more fines). The probability of audit for a taxpayer 
who reports low income is unaffected in equilibrium. Because the aggregate 
number of low-income reports increases, and because each of these taxpayers is 
audited with an unchanged probability, the aggregate number of audits will 
also increase. 
Recall that q is the fraction of taxpayers with high income. As q 
increases, it becomes less likely that a given taxpayer who reports low income 
actually is a low-income individual. Thus in equilibrium, each potential 
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noncomplier must respond to an increase in q by decreasing his probability of 
noncompliance (alternatively, fewer potential noncompliers can actually fail 
to comply). Again the probability of audit given a report of low income is 
unaffected, so aggregate noncompliance and the aggregate probability of audit 
decrease. 
The effects of p, the proportion of potential noncompliers in the 
population, are perhaps the most interesting. As remarked earlier, in the 
literature on tax evasion there is frequent reference to the claim that people 
are becoming more strategic: "Increasingly, the way taxpayers seem to view 
our present tax system is as a game to be won or lost each year. While it is 
fair to say that there are taxpayers still who treat the tax laws as rules to 
be obeyed because they are normative legal rules , • • .  many taxpayers have 
ceased to accept the normativity of our tax structure and instead have begun 
to view tax laws as outcome determinative rules to be considered when 
develping a strategy for action (Hoeflich, 1982, pp. 31-32.)" This increase in 
strategic behavior is often taken to be synonymous with a decrease in 
compliance. The alleged deterioration in compliance is also cited as a cause 
of declining tax revenues. The question is often posed as one of policy -­
what should the IRS do in the face of increased strategic behavior on the part 
of taxpayers? 
Policy recommendations to curb this decline in law-abidingness include 
both harsher penalty systems (more audits, higher fines) and normative 
campaigns. "Field-experimental research undertaken in the United States 
suggests that taxpayer norms are an important factor underlying taxpayer 
behavior and that normative appeals may be more ef fective than sanctions in 
inducing compliance . . . The appa rently strong impact of norms . .  
suggests that tax authorities stand much to gain in compliance terms from 
normative appeals. Such appeals could take the form of education programmes 
aimed both at existing taxpayers and children as potential taxpayers (Spicer 
and Lundstedt 1976, pp. 295,302) ." 
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In contrast, the answer provided by this paper is striking. Here 
there is a clear distinction between the percentage of strategic taxpayers. p, 
and the likelihood of noncompliance a8• From Table 1 we see that an increase 
in p has precisely one ef fect; it reduces the number of potential noncompliers 
who actually fail to comply (alternatively, each potential noncomplier evades 
with a lower probability). Again, this is necessary because with more 
potential noncompliers (i.e., more taxpayers who may falsely report low 
income), a report of low income is correspondingly more likely to have come 
from a noncomplier than a habitual complier with low income. Thus although 
there are more potential noncompliers, each is more likely to comply, and 
these effects exactly cancel each other out. The aggregate number o f  
noncompliant taxpayers is unaffected. Similarly, both the conditional 
probability of audit for an individual who reports low income, and the 
unconditional or aggregate probability of audit, are unchanged. Expected 
revenue net of audit costs is 
Revenue (1-q)[�L(TL-c)+(l-�L)TL) + q [(l-p)T8+p(l-a8>T8J 
+ qpa8 [�L(T8+F-c)+(l-�L)TL). 
Simplifying this expression and keeping in mind that both PN ; qpa8 and 
PA ; (PN+l-q)�L are independent of p. we see that equilibrium expected 
revenues are also independent of p. That is, an exogenous increase in the 
fraction of strategic taxpayers has no impact on aggregate expected revenues 
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or aggregate compliance, and should consequently have no affect on aggregate 
auditing policy. Not only is no change in audit policy warranted to correct 
for the increase in strategic behavior, but the problem itself seems unrelated 
to its hypothetical cause. As long as a strictly positive fraction of 
taxpayers behaves strategically, increases in this fraction do not account for 
declining compliance and tax revenues (at least in this world with no budget 
constraint on the IRS' audit capability) . Of course, if all taxpayers were 
habitual compliers, then no audits would be required. Thus there is a 
discontinuity in the equilibrium at p = 0 ,  but the existence of the policy 
debate presumes p > O. 
4. EXTENSIONS 
An obvious and relevant extension of our basic model is to treat 
taxation as proportional at rate t, so that TH = tIH and TL = tIL. In the 
United States, penalties for underreporting are proportional to evaded tax, so 
that F = nt(IH - IL) ,  where n is the penalty rate on evaded tax. These 
substitutions can be made directly into the equilibrium expressions aH, and PL 
to yield 
aH (1-q) c/pq[t(IH-IL) + nt(IH-IL) - c] 
and 
I\ [u(IH-tIL) - u(IH(l-t) )J/[u(IH-tIL) - u(IH(l-t) -nt(IH-IL) ) ]. 
Comparative statics of aH' PN, PL and PA in the tax rate t, the 
penalty rate n and the income dispersion IH-IL are summarized in Table 2 
below. 
(10) 
(11) 
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Table 2 
n t IH-IL 
-
aH 
PN 
PL -
* * 
PA -
** ** 
• ambiguous in general; when taxpayers are risk-neutral, these entries are O. 
•• ambiguous in general; when taxpayers are risk-neutral, these entries are -
An increase in the penalty rate n decreases equilibrium noncompliance 
and equilibrium auditing, both at the individual and the aggregate levels. It 
is straightforward to show that individual and aggregate noncompliance 
decrease with increases in the tax rate t. The popular press often assumes 
the opposite, and partial equilibrium models are generally ambiguous on this 
matter; Allingham and Sandmo ( 1972) found that when the fine is proportional 
to unreported income (e. g. , F = n(IH-IL) ) ,  an increase in the tax rate t has a 
both an income and a substitution effect. Since the substitution effect is 
negative, while the income effect is positive (negative) if absolute risk 
aversion is decreasing (increasing) , the net effect of an increase in t is 
ambiguous in the (presumed most likely) case of decreasing absolute risk 
aversion. Yitzhaki ( 1974) has noted, however, that penalties for evasion are 
in fact proportional to evaded tax, not unreported income, so that the income 
effect is spurious. Instead he finds that if absolute risk aversion is a 
decreasing function of income, then an increase in the tax rate t 
unambiguously enhances compliance. If absolute risk aversion is increasing 
with income, then Yitzhaki's result too is ambiguous. We find that 
equilibrium compliance is enhanced by an increase in the tax rate t, 
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irrespective of any restrictions on the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, 
and irrespective of whether the fine is based on unreported income or evaded 
tax. The intuition behind this result is as follows: an increase in t has 
the (partial equilibrium) effect of making auditing a more attractive prospect 
for the IRS. In order that the IRS remain indifferent about auditing a 
taxpayer who reports low income, potential noncompliers must comply with a 
greater probability. A similar argument explains why equilibrium compliance 
increases with income inequality, as measured by IH-IL. In general, the 
dependence of both PL and PA upon t and IH-IL are ambiguous; in the case of 
risk-neutral taxpayers, PL = 1/ (1 + n), which is independent of t and IH-IL' 
while PA decreases with t and IH-IL. 
Fishburn (1981) has analyzed the impact of inflation upon the extent 
of tax evasion in the standard "portfolio" model of tax evasion. Holding 
nominal income constant, he shows that evasion increases (decreases) with the 
price level if relative risk aversion is increasing (decreasing). It is 
obvious from equations (10)-(11) that, in our model, scaling all monetary 
parameters (including nominal income) up by a constant A has no effect on 
noncompliance, although the number of audits may be affected. If we hold 
nominal incomes fixed (as did Fishburn), but scale up other monetary 
parameters, then inflation is equivalent to an increase in the audit cost c. 
From Table 1 we know that this has the effect of increasing both noncompliance 
and the number of audits. Indexation of incomes to the rate of inflation 
would restore neutrality. Another way of modeling the impact of inflation is 
to assume that the tax rate t is a function of the price level with t' (A) > O 
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(i.e., bracket creep). Then if all monetary variables are scaled up by A, the 
only remaining impact of inflation is to raise the tax rate t. From Table 2, 
we know that an increase in t increases compliance. Finally, if taxation is 
proportional to income and audit costs and income are subject to inflation, 
but fines are fixed in nominal terms, then an increase in the rate of 
inflation will result in decreased compliance. To see this, scale up audit 
costs and incomes by A. The equilibrium number of noncompliers is 
PA (A) = AC (l-q)/pq[At (IH-IL)-Ac+F]. 
It is straightforward to show that aPA(A)/aA > o. That is, inflation 
unaccompanied by an adjustment in the fine F results in greater noncompliance. 
However, if the fine is proportional to underreported income or evaded taxes, 
then inflation will have no effect on compliance. 
We have heretofore assumed that audits themselves were costless to the 
taxpayer; in fact, an audit can be a costly and time-consuming process, even 
if one can demonstrate the accuracy of one's report. Suppose that the 
taxpayer suffers a cost of $k when audited. The net revenue to the IRS is 
unaffected since k is a deadweight loss rather than a transfer. Thus it is 
• clear that again PH = O; it never pays to audit individuals who report high 
A 
income. Moreover, the same function PL(a) governs the IRS' best response to a 
report of low income when the strategy a is used by taxpayers. Using the fact 
• 
that pH = 0, the expected utility for high- and low-income taxpayers, 
respectively, are: 
U (IH;a,p) aH[pLu(IH-TH-F-k) + (1-pL)u(IH-TL)] + (1-aH)u (IH-TH). 
and 
U (IL;a,p) aL[pLu (IL-TL-k) + (1-pL)u(IL-TL)] + (1-aL)u(IL-TH). 
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The taxpayer wishes to choose (aH,aL) so as to maximize U(.; a,pJ, 
• given PL. The fact that pH = 0 leaves open the possibility that, if IL 2 TH, 
a low-income taxpayer may over-report simply to avoid an audit. 
aU(IH;a,pJ/aaH = pLu(IH-TH-F-k) + (1-pLJu(IH-TL) - u(IH-TH) (1
2) 
aU(IL;a,pJ/aaL = pLu(IL-TL-k) + (1-pLJu(IL-TL) - u(IL-TH). (13) 
Let f1(pLJ denote the right-hand side of equation (1
2), and f2CpLJ the right­
hand side of equation (13). Then the best response function for the strategic 
taxpayer is 
and 
A 
aH(p) 
A 
aL(p) 
{ = 1 if f1CpLJ > 0 
e [0,ll if f1CpLJ = 0 
= O if f1CpLJ < 0 
{ 
. 
1 if f2CpLJ > 0 
[0,1] if f2CpLJ = o. 
o if f2CpLJ < 0 
Note that f1(0) < f2(0) by the strict concavity of u(.) •
10 The functions f1 
and f 2 are linear functions with 
fl 
'<PLJ u(IH-TH-F-k) - u(IH-TL) 
and 
f 2 '<PLJ u(IL-TL-k) - u(IL-TL). 
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A sufficient condition for f1•cpL) < f2•cpLJ is that IH-TH-F �IL-TL . 
That is, the net income of a truthful low income taxpayer is no less than that 
of a discovered high-income noncomplier. This assumption is plausible, but it 
is not implied by previous ones. We proceed under this assumption since it 
greatly simplifies the subsequent analysis. 11 It follows that f1(pLJ < f2(pLJ 
for all PL. This leaves five mutually exclusive and exhaustive possibilities: 
1. fl <PLJ > 0, fzCPLl > o 
2. fl(pLJ = o. f2(pL) > 0 
3 .  f2CPL> = O, f1 CPL> < O 
4. f2(pL) < 0, fl CPL> < o 
s.  f2(pL) > o. fl <PLJ < 0. 
Possibilities (3)-(5) can be ruled out as possible equilibrium 
configurations as follows. Suppose there exists an equilibrium (a*,p*> such 
• • • • that f1(pL) < 0. Then aH = O. Consequently µL(a ) = 0, implying that PL = O. 
• 
But then f1(pL) = f1(0) > 0. This is a contradiction. Hence only cases (1) 
and (2) are possible in equilibrium. 
• • • 
Case 1 implies that� = aH = 1. Then PL = 1 is impossible since 
• 
f1(1) < 0. But PL = 0 is possible. Thus case 1 corresponds to Figure 4 . 
• 
Case 2 corresponds to Figure 5, the interior equilibrium, with '1r. = l, 
and 
• 
aH c(l-a) /(T,,-T. -F-cl - · n L 
p� = [u(IH-TL) - u(IH-THJJ/[u(IH-TL) - u(IH-TH-F-k)]. 
Note that the cost k has no effect on equilibrium noncompliance; no 
low-income taxpayers elect to overreport and the same fraction of high-income 
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taxpayers elect to underreport. The taxpayer audit cost k affects only the 
equilibrium audit probability, which is reduced. Thus the same level of 
noncompliance is sustained with a lower level of auditing. The taxpayer's 
audit cost k is something of a policy variable for the IRS; unfortunately, an 
increase in k is likely to be accompanied by an increase in c, the IRS' audit 
cost. Thus an increase in the complexity of the audit process results in both 
more noncompliance (due to the increase in cl and a lower probability of audit 
for each taxpayer who reports low income (due to the increase in k). However, 
since the number of low income reports is increased, the net effect on the 
aggregate number of audits is ambiguous. 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND QUAL IFICATIONS 
The results of this paper demonstrate the value of regarding tax 
evasion as an equilibrium phenomenon; most (but not all) of the comparative 
static results generated by the usual analysis of the taxpayer's decision 
problem in isolation are contradicted in a simple equilibrium model. In 
particular, we find that increases in the magnitude of sanctions have the 
conjectured effect; that is, an increase in the magnitude of sanctions results 
in more compliance and less auditing in equilibrium. However, an increase in 
the cost of auditing results in both more noncompliance and more auditing, 
while increases in the tax rate and in the degree of income inequality 
actually enhance equilibrium compliance. 
We have also shown that, at least in this simple model, a decline in 
law-abidingness does not account for purported declines in tax compliance and 
tax revenue when the IRS is free to adjust its audit policy to taxpayer 
behavior (i. e., when the IRS does not face a binding budget constraint). 
Alternative explanations which account for both decreasing compliance and 
declining tax revenues include an effective decrease in the penalty for 
evasion F, an exogenous increase in the cost of audit c, or an exogenous 
decrease in the percentage of high-income individuals q. 
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This said, we should mention some of the model's limitations. It is 
evident that we have made assumptions which dramatically simplify an extremely 
complex problem. In addition, the use of the Nash equilibrium concept 
requires both the IRS and the taxpayer to possess a great deal of information. 
It is often argued that were taxpayers really aware of the true probabilities 
of audit and levels of fines, we would observe much more noncompliance. In 
fact, survey research suggests that the probability of noncompliance increases 
after exposure to IRS review. The model, as formulated, does not incorporate 
imperfect information of this sort. 
This model is based on only two categories of taxpayers: high and low 
income. A more realistic model would allow for a continuous distribution of 
income possibilities. Such a model, in which all taxpayers are assumed to be 
strategic, has been developed in Reinganum and Wilde (1984). In a d dition, the 
model presupposes that the IRS can audit as many taxpayers as it desires. 
Budget constraints, however, are a very real problem for the IRS. Introducing 
a budget constraint into this model is a nontrivial task, and we will not 
attempt it here. See Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde (1984) for some initial 
results when total audits are constrained. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. Henry (1983) provides a good summary and critique of this work. 
2. Compliance Gap: H earings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the 
Committee on Finance, 97th Congress, 2d Session (1982). 
3. Vitez (1983), p. 191. 
4. Egger (1983), p. 12. 
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5. There have been a number of papers in the "economics of crime" literature 
which analyze the optimal penalty system (p,F) using a utilitarian 
criterion (Becker, 1968; Stigler, 1970; Brown and Reynolds, 1973; Stern, 
1975; Polinsky and Shavell, 1979). While these papers incorporate a kind 
of equilibrium approach, they are not directly relevant to the tax 
evasion problem, since the probability of detection is not sensitive to 
the actions of the agents. 
6. Our model of the interaction between taxpayers and the IRS is a very 
standard two-state, two-action game. P'ng (1983) and Salant and Rest 
(1982) have used this type of model to analyze the litigation of 
settlement demands in civil torts cases. Subsequently, Salant (1983) has 
generalized their analysis to include an interval of possible settlement 
demands. 
7. We also implicitly assume that Ti + F � Ii' for i: L,H. 
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8. Both taxes and the general structure of penalties are fixed by the 
legislative branch, although the IRS has some control over the choice of 
penalty (e.g., civil versus criminal). We ignore the latter in this 
analysis. 
9. The knife-edge case of aH : 1 has a continuum of equilibria corresponding 
to the heavily outlined portion of the right-hand boundary of Figure 4. 
In this case, all strategic taxpayers underreport, and the IRS is 
indifferent regarding the probability with which it audits taxpayers who 
report low income. 
10. f1(0) - f2CO) : u(IH-TL) - u(IL-TL) - [u(IH-TH) - u(IL-TH)] < 0 by the 
strict concavity of u(.). 
11. If taxpayers are risk neutral, then it follows that f1·c�L) < f2·c�L) 
without any additional parametric restrictions. 
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